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Reno v. Koray:
TIME CONFINED IN
A TREATMENT
CENTER AS A
CONDITION OF
RELEASE ON BAIL
DOES NOT QUALIFY
FOR CREDIT
AGAINST TIME
SERVED UNDER
18 U.S.C. § 3585(b).
Section 3585(b) of Ti-
tle 18 of the United States Code
provides that sentence credit
should be given for time served
in official detention prior to sen-
tencing. In Reno v. Koray, 115
S. Ct. 2021 (1995), the United
States Supreme Court deter-
mined that credit for time served
shall not extend to time detained
at a treatment center while re-
leased on bail prior to sentenc-
ing.
After pleading guilty to
laundering money, Ziya Koray
("Koray") was ordered released
on bail pending sentencing. As
a condition of release, the Unit-
ed States District Court for the
District of Maryland required
that Koray be confined to a com-
munity treatment center until
sentencing. Koray was not al-
lowed to leave the treatment
center for any reason unless
accompanied by a Government
special agent. Koray remained
confined to the treatment center
for approximately 150 days,
after which time he was sen-
tenced to forty-one months at
Allenwood Federal Prison in
Pennsylvania.
The Bureau of Prisons
("BOP") denied Koray's re-
quest for credit toward his sen-
tence for the time spent at the
treatment center. A petition to
the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Penn-
sylvania for credit was also de-
nied. The Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit, however, de-
termined that official detention
under section 3585(b) should
include jail-type confinement.
The court reversed and remand-
ed for a determination ofwheth-
er Koray's confinement at the
treatment center was, in fact,
jail-type.
The Government's pe-
tition for certiorari was granted
by the United States Supreme
Court to determine whether time
confined to a treatment center
while released on bail qualifies
as "official detention" under
section 3585(b); thus, entitling
a defendant to sentence credit
for time confined. The Court
held that it does not.
In reaching its decision,
the Court conducted a four-part
analysis of section 3585(b): (1)
the plain meaning of the stat-
ute; (2) the statute in conjunc-
tion with the Bail Reform Act
of 1984; (3) the context and
history of the statute in con-
junction with related sentenc-
ing provisions; and (4) the stat-
ute as defined by BOP internal
guidelines.
Koray argued that a
plain meaning interpretation of
official detention should be ap-
plied. Koray, 115 S. Ct. at
2027. A plain meaning inter-
pretation would include both
detained confinement and situ-
ations where equally restrictive
conditions are placed on re-
leased confinement. Id. Al-
though Koray was released on
bail, his detainment at the treat-
ment center was subject to re-
straints which were significant-
ly similar to those imposed on a
detained defendant assigned to
a treatment center as part of his
sentence. Koray was subject to
random breath and urine tests,
his access to visitors was limit-
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ed, he had to account for his
presence five times a day, and
he was not allowed to leave the
treatment center unless accom-
panied by a Special Agent.
The Court acknowl-
edged that Koray's plain mean-
ing definition of official deten-
tion is plausible when viewed
in isolation. However, a "'fun-
damental principle of statutory
construction . . . [is] that the
meaning of a word cannot be
determined in isolation, but
must be drawn from the context
in which it is used."' Id. at 2025
(quoting Deal v. United States,
113 S. Ct. 1993, 1996 (1993)).
Therefore, section 3 58 5(b) must
be interpreted in conjunction
with the Bail Reform Act of
1984, enacted in the same stat-
ute as the Sentencing Reform
Act of 1984 (of which section
3585 is a part), and which au-
thorizes federal courts to re-
strain the liberty of a defendant.
Id.
The Court noted that the
Bail Reform Act provided a
court with two options for treat-
ment of defendants awaiting
sentencing--release on bail or
detainment without bail. A
court releasing a defendant on
bail may impose a variety of
restrictive conditions on a de-
fendant's release, including res-
idence in a community treat-
ment center. Id. A court detain-
ing a defendant issues a deten-
tion order which commits the
defendant to the custody of the
Attorney General for confine-
ment in a correctional facility.
1d.
Based on this analysis,
the Court determined that a de-
fendant is considered detained
only when committed to the
custody of the Attorney Gener-
al, and a defendant given bail
with restrictive conditions, like
Koray, is considered released.
Id Emphasis is thereby placed
on the identity of the defen-
dant's custodian. Thus, Koray
was not officially detained with-
in the meaning of the Bail Re-
form Act because he was not in
the custody of and subject to the
BOP's control. Id. at 2028.
The Court next sought
to interpret section 3585(b) in
conjunction with the history and
'context of this section and re-
lated sentencing statutes. Id. at
2026. In 1984, section 3585(b)
replaced section 3568. Section
3585(b) replaced section 3568's
term "in custody" withthe term
"official detention." Id. Histor-
ically, section 3568 was inter-
preted uniformly to preclude
sentence credit for restrictions
placed on a defendant's liberty
as a condition of release on bail.
Id. Therefore, the Court inter-
preted Congress' intent in
amending the language of sec-
tion 3585(b) as merely an at-
tempt to conform its language
to that of related sentencing stat-
utes and the Bail Reform Act.
Id.
Section 3585(a) dictates
that a sentence begin when the
defendant arrives at an official
detention facility. Comparing
the language of related sentenc-
ing statutes, the Court noted
that section 3621 of Title 18
submits a sentenced defendant
to the custody of the BOP, and
vests in the BOP the authority
to designate which penal or cor-
rectional facility a defendant
will reside in. Id. at 2025-26.
Further, section 3622 of Title
18 grants the BOP authority to
allow a prisoner to be released
to participate in an educational
program while in official de-
tention, and to allow work re-
lease of a prisoner while in
official detention. Id. at 2026.
Based on this analysis,
the Court determined that an
official detention facility is a
correctional facility designated
by the BOP (as provided for in
section 3621), and that official
detention should have the same
meaning in section 3585(b) as
in related sentencing statutes.
Id Thus, Koray was not offi-
cially detained, as defined by
the history and context of sec-
tion 3585(b) when compared to
related sentencing statutes.
Finally, the Court found
persuasive a Bureau of Prisons
Program Statement which
clearly interpreted the meaning
and intent of section 3585(b).
The Statement asserted that
"' [t]ime spent in residence in a
community corrections center.
. as a result of a condition of
bail or bond. . . is not creditable
as pre-sentence time. "' Id. at
2027 n.4 (quoting U. S. Dept. of
Justice, Bureau of Prisons Pro-
gram StatementNo. 5880.28(c)
(July 19, 1994)) (emphasis add-
ed). The Statement also assert-
ed that highly restrictive con-
finement as a condition of bail
is not considered time served in
official detention. Id Thus,
Koray was not officially de-
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tained, as defined by BOP in-
ternal guidelines.
In her concurring opin-
ion, Justice Ginsburg pointed
out an interesting ramification
of this statutory interpretation.
A due process defense may
emerge for a defendant who did
not elect bail with the under-
standing that time released to a
treatment center, as opposed to
detained to a treatment center
orjail, would preclude sentence
credit. Strategically, criminal
defendants may be wise to
request that the court deny bail
and hold them in custody if
their release on bail would be
subject to restraints (i.e., con-
finement to a treatment center)
which do not materially differ
from those imposed on a de-
tained defendant.
In Reno v. Koray, the
Court recognized that restraints
imposed on a released defen-
dant may not materially differ
from those imposed on a de-
tained defendant. However,
adopting the Third Circuit's test
of jail-type confinement would
place an onerous burden on the
fact-finder and, more important-
ly, create a potential for dispar-
ity in treatment of defendants.
Determination of whether a
defendant will receive credit for
time served must, therefore, turn
on whether the defendant
enjoyed a released or detained
status.
-Cynthia L. Maskol
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